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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Lisa Renee Hensdell appeals from the Judgment/Order Of Restitution 
entered after she was convicted and sentenced for felony leaving the scene of 
an injury accident. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Hensdell was convicted, after a jury trial, of felony leaving the scene of an 
injury accident and misdemeanor inattentive driving and driving without 
privileges. (R., pp.186-87.) The district court imposed an aggregate unified 
sentence of five years with two years fixed, but suspended the sentence and 
placed Hensdell on probation for five years. (R., pp.197-211.) At Hensdell's 
sentencing hearing, on June 27, 2011, the state asked the district court to 
reserve ruling on restitution because the state had not yet "been able to 
completely compile the information submitted by the victim." (Tr., p.472, Ls.2-6.) 
The district court granted the state's request and set the matter for a status 
conference and restitution hearing on September 26, 2011. (R., p.212; Tr., 
p.484, Ls.18-24; see also R., p.202 (notation in judgment: "The Court determines 
that this case is [sic] may be appropriate for restitution, and a restitution hearing 
will be held at the time of the status conference on September 26, 2011.").) 
Hensdell violated her probation almost immediately and, as a result, the 
scheduled September 26, 2011 status conference and restitution hearing did not 
go forward. (R., pp.7-8, 215-17.) Instead, the district court conducted an 
evidentiary hearing on September 12, 2011, after which it found Hensdell in 
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violation of her probation. (R., pp.231-33.) The court revoked Hensdell's 
probation, ordered her sentence executed and retained jurisdiction. (R., pp.235-
42.) Regarding restitution, the order revoking probation and retaining jurisdiction, 
entered October 3, 2011, provided: "The Court determines that this is or maybe 
[sic] an appropriate case for restitution and restitution will be addressed at the 
Rider Review Hearing." (R., p.240.) 
The district court conducted a review hearing on April 2, 2012, at which it 
suspended the balance of Hensdell's sentence and again placed her on 
probation. (R., pp.256-57, 259-71.) At the state's request, the court left the 
issue of restitution open until a status conference scheduled for July 2, 2012. 
(R., pp.256-67; see also R., p.262 (notation in Order Re: Review Hearing ("The 
Court determines that this case may be appropriate for restitution, but restitution 
shall be held open until the 90 day status hearing.").) 
On June 29, 2012, the state filed a restitution request, seeking a total of 
$36,333.02 in restitution. (R., pp.287-88.) Hensdell did not object to the state's 
request for restitution and, in fact, asked the court at the July 2, 2012 status 
conference and restitution hearing to order restitution in the amount sought -
minus $15.95 for a medical expense unrelated to Hensdell's criminal conduct -
and to leave it to the parties to resolve whether the restitution amount was 
ultimately correct. (Tr., p.489, Ls.12-22, p.490, L.12-p.491, L.7.) The court 
granted Hensdell's request, ordered restitution in the total amount of $36,317.07, 
and gave Hensdell 30 days to file any request for reduction of the restitution 
amount. (Tr., p.491, Ls.8-17; R., pp.243-52, 289-93.) Hensdell did not file any 
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request for reduction. (See generally R., p.10.) She did file a notice of appeal 
timely from the court's Judgment/Order Of Restitution. (R., pp.294-97.) 
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ISSUE 
Hensdell states the issue on appeal as: 
Did the district court exceed its authority by entering the restitution 
order in contravention of I.C. § 19-5304(6)? 
(Appellant's brief, p.4.) 
The state rephrases the issue as: 
Must this Court decline to consider Hensdell's claim that the district court 
exceeded its statutory authority to enter the restitution award because,. as 




Hensdell Failed To Preserve For Appeal Her Claim That The District Court 
Lacked Statutory Authority To Enter A Restitution Order 
For the first time on appeal, Hensdell argues that the district court 
exceeded its authority under I.C. § 19-5304(6) by ordering restitution more than 
a year after she was sentenced for felony leaving the scene of an accident. 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) Specifically, she contends the court "did not act 
consistently with the applicable legal standards" because it "did not find that the 
delay in entering the restitution order was reasonably necessary," as required by 
I.C. § 19-5304(6), State v. Jensen, 149 Idaho 758, 241 P.3d 1 (Ct. App. 2010), 
and State v. Ferguson, 138 Idaho 659, 67 P.3d 1271 (Ct. App. 2002). 
(Appellant's brief, pp.5-6.) As Hensdell all but concedes (see Appellant's brief, 
p.6), however, this issue is not properly before this Court because, unlike the 
defendants in Jensen and Ferguson, Hensdell did not object below to the entry 
of the restitution order. 
It is well settled that Idaho's appellate courts "will not consider issues not 
raised in the court below." State v. Mosqueda, 150 Idaho 830, 833, 252 P.3d 
563, 566 (Ct. App. 2011) (citing State v. Wheaton, 121 Idaho 404, 407, 825 P.2d 
501, 504 (1992)). To be preserved for appeal, a claim that restitution was not 
statutorily authorized must have been raised to the trial court. !sl (citing State v. 
Dorsey, 126 Idaho 659, 662, 889 P.2d 93, 96 (Ct. App. 1995)). An exception to 
the preservation doctrine exists in criminal proceedings for claims of fundamental 
error. See !sl (citing State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245, P.3d 961 (201 O); State 
v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 571, 165, P.3d 273, 285 (2007)) ("The fundamental error 
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doctrine allows a criminal defendant the opportunity, in strictly limited 
circumstances, to raise an issue challenging his conviction on direct appeal that 
was not formally preserved before the trial court."). "[T]he fundamental error 
doctrine may not be invoked to raise a restitution issue for the first time on 
appeal," however, "because restitution proceedings are civil in nature." !st. at 
834, 252 P.3d at 567 .. 
Applying the foregoing legal principles in Mosqueda, the Court of Appeals 
declined to consider Mosqueda's claim, raised for the first time on appeal, that 
certain expenses for which the district court had ordered restitution were not 
compensable under Idaho's restitution statute. !st. at 833, 252 P.3d at 566. The 
Court also declined to consider Mosqueda's unpreserved claim that the 
restitution award was vindictive and violated his right to due process, specifically 
rejecting Mosqueda's argument that appellate review could lie under the 
fundamental error doctrine. !st. at 833-34, 252 P.3d at 566-67. 
In this case, as in Mosqueda, Hensdell failed to preserve the issue she 
asks this Court to consider on appeal. Hensdell argues that, because the trial 
court did not make a specific finding that the approximately one-year delay 
between sentencing and the entry of the restitution order was "reasonably 
necessary" to facilitate the correct computation of the restitution amount, the trial 
court exceeded its authority under I.C. § 19-5304(6) in entering the restitution 
order. (Appellant's brief, pp.5-7.) As Hensdell acknowledges on appeal 
(Appellant's brief, p.6), however, she did not challenge the district court's 
authority to enter the restitution order below (see Tr., p.489, Ls.12-22, p.490, 
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L.12 - p.491, L.18). In fact, she specifically asked the court to enter the 
restitution order (Tr., p.490, L.17 - p.491, L.7) and, when given the opportunity to 
challenge the order after its entry, she failed to do so (Tr., p.491, Ls.8-17; see 
generally R., p.10). 
Because Hensdell never argued below that the district court exceeded its 
statutory authority by entering the restitution order approximately one year after 
she was sentenced, Hensdell failed to preserve this issue for appeal. 
Mosqueda, 150 Idaho at 833, 252 P.3d at 566. Because the issue was not 
preserved and is not subject to review under the fundamental error doctrine, this 
Court must decline to consider it. 19.:. at 833-34, 252 P.3d at 566-67. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that this Court affirm the district court's 
Judgment/Order Of Restitution. 
DATED this 5th day of August 2013. 
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